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Abstract
Recent research in quantitative theories for information-hiding topics, such as Anonymity and Secure In-
formation Flow, tend to converge towards the idea of modeling the system as a noisy channel in the
information-theoretic sense. The notion of information leakage, or vulnerability of the system, has been
related in some approaches to the concept of mutual information of the channel. A recent work of Smith has
shown, however, that if the attack consists in one single try, then the mutual information and other concepts
based on Shannon entropy are not suitable, and he has proposed to use Re´nyi’s min-entropy instead. In
this paper, we consider and compare two diﬀerent possibilities of deﬁning the leakage, based on the Bayes
risk, a concept related to Re´nyi min-entropy.
Keywords: Information-hiding, hypothesis testing, probability of error, Re´nyi min-entropy.
1 Introduction
Information-hiding refers to a large class of problems including Secure Information
Flow and Anonymity. There has been a growing interest in developing quantitative
theories for this class of problems, because it has been recognized that non quanti-
tative (i.e. possibilistic) approaches are in general too coarse, in the sense that they
tend to consider as equivalent systems that have very diﬀerent degrees of protection.
Concepts from Information Theory have revealed quite convenient in this do-
main. In particular, the notion of noisy channel has been used to model protocols
for information-hiding, and the ﬂow of information in programs. The idea is that
the input of the channel represents the information to be kept secret, and the output
represents the observable. The noise of the channel is generated by the eﬀorts of
the protocol to hide the link between the secrets and the observable, often achieved
by using randomized mechanisms.
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Correspondingly, there have been various attempts to deﬁne the degree of leak-
age by using concepts based on Shannon entropy, notably the mutual information
[14,4,7,8] and the related notion of capacity [10,9,2].
In a recent work, however, Smith has shown that the concept of mutual infor-
mation is not very suitable for modeling the information leakage in the situation in
which the adversary attempts to guess the value of the secret in one single try [12].
He shows an example of two programs in which the mutual information is about
the same, but the probability of making the right guess, after having observed the
output, is much higher in one program than in the other. In a subsequent paper
[13], Smith proposes to use a notion based on Re´nyi min-entropy.
We look at the problem from the point of view of the probability of error : the
probability that an adversary makes the wrong guess. We propose to formalize
the notion of leakage as the “diﬀerence” between the probability of error a priori
(before observing the output) and a posteriori (using the output to infer the input
via the so-called MAP rule). We argue that there are at least two natural ways
of deﬁning this diﬀerence: one, that we call multiplicative, corresponds to Smith’s
proposal. The other, which we call additive, is new. In both cases, we show that it
is relatively easy to ﬁnd the suprema, which is nice in that it allows us to consider
the worst case of leakage. The worst case is also interesting because it abstracts
from the input distribution, which is usually unknown, or (in the case of anonymity)
may depend on the set of users.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Noisy channels and Hypothesis Testing
In this section we brieﬂy review some basic notions about noisy channels and hy-
pothesis testing that will be used throughout the paper. We refer to [5] for more
details.
A channel is a tuple 〈X,Y, p(·|·)〉 where X,Y are random variables representing,
respectively, the input with possible values X = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} (the secrets or
hypotheses) and the output with possible values Y = {y1, y2, . . . , ym} (the observ-
ables). The distribution on X, π = (π1, . . . , πn) is called a priori input distribution.
We will also use the notation p(xi) and p(yj) to indicate the probabilities of the in-
put xi (i.e. p(xi) = πi) and the output yj , respectively. We will denote by p(yj |xi)
the conditional probability of observing the output yj when the input is xi. These
conditional probabilities constitute what is called the channel matrix, where p(yj |xi)
is the element at the intersection of the i-th row and j-th column.
The a posteriori probability p(xi|yj) is the probability that the input is xi, given
that we observe the output yj . The a priori and the a posteriori probabilities of xi
are related by Bayes theorem:
p(xi|yj) = p(yj |xi) p(xi)
p(yj)
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In hypothesis testing we try to infer the true hypothesis (i.e. the value that
was really given in input) from the observed output value. In general, it is not
possible to determine the right hypothesis with certainty. We are interested, then,
in minimizing the probability of error, i.e. the probability of making the wrong guess.
We assume that the process of guessing the hypothesis is represented by a de-
cision function f : Y → X , i.e. the function which gives, for every output yj , the
guessed input xi.
The (average) probability of error associated to f is given by the sum of the
probabilities of guessing a wrong hypothesis for each given output, averaged by the
probabilities of the outputs. Since the probability of making the wrong guess, when
the output is yj , is given by 1− p(f(yj)|yj), the average probability of error is:
PEf =
∑
j p(yj)(1− p(f(yj)|yj))
= 1−∑j p(yj)p(f(yj)|yj)
It is easy to see that a decision function fB minimizes the probability of error
if and only if it satisﬁes the MAP (Maximum A Posteriori probability) criterion,
namely, for each output yj it chooses an input xi for which p(xi|yj) is maximum.
Formally:
fB(yj) = xi ⇒ ∀k p(xi|yj) ≥ p(xk|yj)
It is easy to see that the probability of error associated to fB is then given by
PEB = 1−
∑
j p(yj) maxi p(xi|yj)
By using Bayes theorem, we can rewrite PEB as:
PEB = 1−
∑
j maxi(p(yj |xi)πi)
PEB is also called the Bayes risk. Note that it is a function of π, so we will also
write PEB (π) when we need to emphasize its dependency on π.
2.2 Re´nyi entropies, Shannon entropy, and mutual information
Re´nyi entropies [11] are a family of functions representing the uncertainty associated
to a random variable. The Re´nyi entropy of order α, with α ≥ 0 and α = 1, is deﬁned
as
Hα(X) =
1
1− α log
(∑
i
p(xi)α
)
In the case of a uniform distribution all the Re´nyi entropies of are equal to logn.
Otherwise the entropies are weakly decreasing as a function of α. The following are
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some particular cases:
α = 0 H0(X) = log |X| = logn Hartley entropy
α → 1 H1(X) = −
∑
i p(xi) log p(xi) Shannon entropy
α →∞ H∞(X) = − logmaxi p(xi) min-entropy
Shannon conditional entropy of X given Y represents the average residual en-
tropy of X once the value of Y is known, and it is deﬁned as
H1(X|Y ) = −
∑
y
p(y)H1(X|Y = y) =
∑
ij
p(xi, yj) log p(xi|yj) = H1(X,Y )−H1(Y )
where H1(X,Y ) represents the entropy of the conjunction of X and Y .
The mutual information of X and Y represents the correlation of information
between X and Y . It is deﬁned as
I(X;Y ) = H1(X)−H1(X|Y ) = H1(X) + H1(Y )−H1(X,Y )
It is possible to show that I(X;Y ) ≥ 0, with I(X;Y ) = 0 iﬀ X and Y are indepen-
dent.
2.3 Convexity and corner points
We recall here some basic notions of convexity. Let R be the set of real numbers.
The elements λ1, λ2, . . . , λk ∈ R constitute a set of convex coeﬃcients if, for every
i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, λi ≥ 0 and
∑
k λk = 1. Given a vector space V , a convex combination
of v1, v2, . . . , vk ∈ V is any vector of the form
∑
i λi vi where λ1, λ2, . . . , λk ∈ R are
a set of convex coeﬃcients.
Deﬁnition 2.1 (Convex set) A subset S of a vector space is convex if every
convex combination of vectors in S is in S.
In the following we will denote by D(n) the domain of probability distributions
of dimension n. It is easy to see that, for every n, D(n) is convex.
We give now the deﬁnition of convex function.
Deﬁnition 2.2 (Convex function) Given a convex subset S of a vector space V ,
and a function f : S → R, we say that f is convex if for any v1, v2, . . . , vk ∈ S and
any set of convex coeﬃcients λ1, λ2, . . . , λk ∈ R, we have f(
∑
i λi vi) ≤
∑
i λif(vi).
A function f is concave if its opposite −f is convex.
We now introduce (with a slight abuse of terminology) the concept of convex
base.
Given a subset S of V , the convex hull of S, which we will denote by ch(S), is
the smallest convex set containing S. Since the intersection of convex sets is convex,
it is clear that ch(S) always exists.
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Deﬁnition 2.3 Given two vector sets S and U , we say that U is a convex base for
S if U ⊆ S and S ⊆ ch(U).
In the following, for a given vector v = (v1, v2, . . . , vn), we will use the notation
(v, f(v)) to denote the vector (with one additional dimension) (v1, v2, . . . , vn, f(v)).
Similarly, given a vector set S in a n-dimensional space, we will use the notation
(S, f(S)) to represent the set of vectors {(v, f(v)) | v ∈ S} in a (n+1)-dimensional
space. The notation f(S) represents the image of S under f , i.e. f(S) = {f(v) |
v ∈ S}.
Deﬁnition 2.4 Given a vector set S, a convex base U of S, and a function f :
S → R, we say that U is a set of corner points of f if (U, f(U)) is a convex base for
(S, f(S)). We also say that f is convexly generated by f(U).
In other words, if U is a set of corner points of f , then for every v ∈ D(n), there
are elements u1, u2, . . . , uk in U and λ1, λ2, . . . , λk in R such that v =
∑
i λiui and
f(v) =
∑
i λif(ui).
3 Mutual Information and Capacity
In [12] Smith proved that the notion of mutual information (based on Shannon
entropy) is not suitable to express the information leakage when the adversary tries
to guess the value of the input in one single try. In fact, he showed an example of
systems with the same mutual information, the same a priori uncertainty, and for
which the probabilities of guessing the right input a posteriori (i.e. after observing
the output) are very diﬀerent.
The systems in Smith’s example are deterministic, i.e. have the property that
the input determines univocally the output. For such systems, it turns out that
the discrepancy observed for the mutual information does not arise in the case of
the capacity. Surprisingly, indeed, Smith showed in [13] that, under a uniform
input distribution, the capacity is equal to the logarithm of the ratio between the a
posteriori and the a priori probability of making a right guess, which coincides with
his proposal for the notion of leakage. We will come back on this point in the next
section.
Unfortunately, this coincidence does not carry out to the more general case of
probabilistic channels, and, worse yet, the notion of capacity suﬀers (in the general
case) from the same problem as the mutual information. The following example
illustrates the situation.
Example 3.1 Consider the following channels:
It is easy to see that the Shannon capacity of C is 1/3, while the one of D is 2/3.
However, under the uniform input distribution, the ratio between the a posteriori
and the a priori probability of making the right guess is the same (2).
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y1 y2 y3
x1 2/3 1/6 1/6
x2 1/6 2/3 1/6
x3 1/6 1/6 2/3
Fig. 1. Channel matrix C
y1 y2 y3
x1 2/3 1/3 0
x2 0 2/3 1/3
x3 1/3 0 2/3
Fig. 2. Channel matrix D
4 Towards a more suitable notion of leakage
In the following, we are interested in quantifying the leakage of a security protocol,
i.e. the amount of information about the input that an adversary can learn by
running the protocol and observing the resulting output.
4.1 Probabilities of a right guess
Before running the protocol, the probability that a given input xi occurs depends
only on the a priori distribution π, and a rational adversary will therefore assume
that the most probable input, called the a priori probability of a right guess PRi(π),
will be the input having the maximum a priori probability, i.e.:
Deﬁnition 4.1 The a priori probability of a right guess is deﬁned as
PRi(π) = maxi πi
After running the protocol and seeing the output, the adversary may revise his
guess. An adversary applying the MAP rule, when observing output yj , will choose
as most probable input xi the one for which the a posteriori probability p(xi|yj) is
the highest. The average of this value on all possible outputs gives the a posteriori
probability of a right guess PRo(π), which is the complement of the Bayes risk.
Deﬁnition 4.2 The a posteriori probability of a right guess is deﬁned as
PRo(π) =
∑
j maxi(p(yj |xi)πi)
In the rest of this paper, we will consider only adversaries applying the MAP
rule since this is the rule that gives the best result (from the point of view of the
adversary).
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4.2 Leakage and uncertainty
Intuitively, the leakage is the amount of information learnt by the adversary by
observing the output of the protocol. Following [13], it seems natural to deﬁne it as
the diﬀerence between the uncertainty about the input before observing the output,
and the remaining uncertainty afterwards:
Information Leaked= Initial Uncertainty− Remaining Uncertainty (1)
Now, the question is how to measure information, and (correspondingly) what
do we actually mean by uncertainty. We consider here two possibilities. The ﬁrst
leads to a multiplicative notion of leakage, and it follows the proposal of Smith [13].
The second leads to an additive notion, and it is new.
4.3 Multiplicative leakage
In relation to Equation (1), Smith [13] measures the information in bits, and pro-
poses to deﬁne the initial uncertainty as the min-entropy of X, H∞(X), the instance
of Re´nyi entropy [11] obtained for α = ∞. As for the remaining uncertainty, it would
be natural to use the conditional min-entropy of X given Y . Unfortunately there
is no agreement on what Re´nyi’s generalization of Shannon’s conditional entropy
should be, even though there seem to be a consensus towards
∑
y p(y)Hα(X|Y = y)
[1]. Smith however proposes to use the deﬁnition of H∞(X|Y ) equivalent to the
one given in [6], which is
H∞(X|Y ) = − logPRo(π)
In this way, Smith obtains a deﬁnition of leakage similar to the deﬁnition of
mutual information, except that Shannon entropy is replaced by H∞:
L(X;Y ) = H∞(X)−H∞(X|Y ) = log PRo(π)PRi(π)
We consider a similar deﬁnition for leakage, namely the ratio between PRo(π)
and PRi(π), which coincides with Smith’s notion apart from the absence of the log-
arithm. Furthermore, in general we want to abstract from the a priori distribution,
and consider the worst case, hence we are particularly interested in the supremum
of such ratio.
Deﬁnition 4.3 We deﬁne the multiplicative leakage as
L×(π) = PRo(π)PRi(π)
We will also use the notation ML× to represent the supremum of this quantity:
ML× = max
π
(L×(π))
Note that PRi(π) > 0 for every π, hence L×(π) is always deﬁned.
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4.4 Additive leakage
Another possible interpretation for Equation (1) is to consider the uncertainty as the
probability of guessing the wrong input. The leakage then expresses how much the
knowledge of the observable helps decreasing such probability. This leads to deﬁne
the leakage as the diﬀerence between the probabilities of error before and after
observing the output. As usual, we are particularly interested in the supremum of
this diﬀerence.
Deﬁnition 4.4 We deﬁne the additive leakage as
L+(π) = PRo(π)− PRi(π)
We will also use the notation ML+ to represent the supremum of this quantity:
ML+ = max
π
(L+(π))
5 Properties of the mutiplicative leakage
In this section we consider the multiplicative leakage and we study its supremum. It
turns out that the supremum is very easy to compute. In fact, it coincides with the
value of the leakage in the point of uniform distribution, and it is equal to the sum
of the maxima of the columns. This property was also discovered independently by
Geoﬀrey Smith and Ziyuan Meng (personal communication).
Proposition 5.1
ML× = L×(πu) =
∑
j
max
i
p(yj |xi)
where πu is the uniform distribution.
Proof
L×(π1, . . . , πn) = 1maxi πi
∑
j maxi(p(yj |xi)πi)
≤ 1maxi πi
∑
j maxi p(yj |xi)(maxi πi)
=
∑
j maxi p(yj |xi)
= 1n
∑
j maxi(p(yj |xi) 1n)
= L×( 1n , . . . , 1n)

6 Properties of the additive leakage
We turn now our attention to the additive leakage. We will see that the supremum
is not always in the point of uniform distribution. However, we prove that it is in
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one of the corner points of PRi . Since PRi has a ﬁnite set of corner points, and
their form is known, also the additive leakage is relatively easy to compute.
First we prove a general property concerning the relation between suprema,
convexity, and corner points:
Proposition 6.1 Consider two functions f, g : D(n) → R where f has a set of
corner points U , and g is convex. Deﬁne h : D(n) → R as h(v) = f(v) + g(v).
Let w ∈ D(n) be a point in which h has a maximum, i.e. for every v ∈ D(n),
h(v) ≤ h(w). Then there exists u ∈ U such that h(w) = h(u). Namely, the
maximum value of h is in a corner point of f .
Proof
By contradiction. Suppose that for every u ∈ U , h(u) < h(w). Since w ∈ D(n),
there are elements v1, v2, . . . , vk in U and c1, c2, . . . , ck in R such that w =
∑
i civi
and f(x) =
∑
i cif(vi). Then
h(w) = h(
∑
i civi)
= f(
∑
i civi) + g(
∑
i civi)
=
∑
i cif(vi) + g(
∑
i civi)
≤ ∑i cif(vi) +∑i cig(vi) since g is convex
=
∑
i cih(vi)
<
∑
i cih(w) since vi ∈ U
= h(w) since
∑
ci = 1

An example of Proposition 6.1 is illustrated in Figure 3.
We now show that −PRi and PRo satisfy the hypotheses of Proposition 6.1.
The necessary property for −PRi comes from a result in [3].
Proposition 6.2 ([3], Proposition 3.9) The function PRi on D(n) is convexly
generated by (U, f(U)) with U = U1 ∪ U2 ∪ . . . ∪ Un where, for each r, Ur is the set
of all vectors that have value 1/r in exactly r components, and 0 everywhere else.
Remark 6.3 The function −PRi has the same corner points as PRi .
We now prove that PRo satisfy the necessary property.
Proposition 6.4 PRo is convex.
Proof
Let z be the convex combination
∑
i λi zi where the dimension of z, z1, . . . , zm cor-
responds to the number of input variables and z1, . . . , zm is a set of corner points.
The jth component zkj of any corner point zk corresponds to the input variable xkj
chosen according to the MAP rule when the output variable yj is obtained.
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Fig. 3. An illustration of Proposition 6.1
PRo(
∑
i λi zi) =
∑
j maxk{p(yj |xk)(
∑
i λi zi)k}
=
∑
j p(yj |xkj )(
∑
i λi zi)kj
=
∑
j p(yj |xkj )(
∑
i λi zi,kj )
=
∑
j
∑
i λip(yj |xkj )zi,kj
=
∑
i λi
∑
j p(yj |xkj )zi,kj
≤ ∑i λi∑j maxk p(yj |xk)zi,k
=
∑
i λiPRo(zi)

Corollary 6.5 ML+ is reached on one of the corner points of PRi .
Proof
Since L+ = PRo − PRi and PRo is convex, Proposition 6.1 shows that if ML+
exists, it must be reached on a corner point of −PRi , which correspond to the
corner points of PRi . 
Remark 6.6 In general ML+ is not reached on the point of uniform distribution.
Example 6.7 Consider the channel whose matrix is given in Figure 4.
The calculation of L+ on the distributions corresponding to the corner points
gives:
C. Braun et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 249 (2009) 75–9184
y1 y2 y3
x1 1 0 0
x2 0 1− e e
x3 0 1− 2e 2e
Fig. 4. Channel matrix (e ∈ [0, 1/2])
Corner points PRo PRi L+
(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1) 1 1 0
(1/2, 1/2, 0), (1/2, 0, 1/2) 1 1/2 1/2
(0, 1/2, 1/2) (e + 1)/2 1/2 e/2
(1/3, 1/3, 1/3) (e + 2)/3 1/3 (e + 1)/3
We have for every e ∈ [0, 1/2[,
0 = L+(1, 0, 0) ≤ L+(0, 1/2, 1/2) < L+(1/3, 1/3, 1/3) < L+(1/2, 1/2, 0) = 1/2
and L+(1/3, 1/3, 1/3) = L+(1/2, 1/2, 0) = 1/2 for e = 1/2. Therefore if e <
1/2, ML+ = 1/2, reached on distributions that are diﬀerent from the uniform
distribution (1/3, 1/3, 1/3).
Moreover, this remark holds also for symmetric matrices:
Remark 6.8 Even in case of symmetric matrices, in general ML+ is not reached
on the point of uniform distribution.
Example 6.9 Consider the channel whose matrix is given in Figure 5.
y1 y2 y3 . . . y10 y11
x1 0 1/10 1/10 . . . 1/10 1/10
x2 1/10 0 1/10 . . . 1/10 1/10
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
x10 1/10 1/10 1/10 . . . 0 1/10
x11 1/10 1/10 1/10 . . . 1/10 0
Fig. 5.
Let π = (1/r, 1/r, . . . , 1/r, 0, . . . , 0) be the a priori distribution with an equal
probability of 1/r for the r ﬁrst inputs. This distribution is a corner point of the
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matrix, and since the matrix is symmetric, any other corner point corresponding to
a distribution containing r non-null probabilities of 1/r will give the same results
for PRi , PRo and L+.
PRi(π) = 1/r
PRo(π) =
∑
1,...,11(1/r)(1/10)
= 11/(10r)
L+(π) = PRo(π)− PRi(π)
= 1/(10r)
Therefore ML+ is reached when r has the smallest value, i.e. when r = 2. This
corresponds to the distribution (1/2, 1/2, 0, . . . , 0) and gives ML+ = 1/20, while
L+(1/11, . . . , 1/11) = 1/110.
7 Comparison
In this section, we compare the two notions of leakage. We ﬁrst compare them
with respect to a speciﬁc distribution, and then we consider the comparison of their
worst cases.
If we consider a speciﬁc distribution, it comes out that the two notions are
equivalent, in the sense that a program is better with respect to the additive notion
if and only if it is better with respect to the multiplicative notion.
Proposition 7.1 Consider two programs P and P ′, and let L+ and L+′ be the
additive measures of leakage for P and P ′, respectively. Analogously, let L× and
L×′ be the multiplicative measures of leakage for P and P ′, respectively. We have
that, for every π
L+(π) ≤ L+′(π) ⇔ L×(π) ≤ L×′(π)
Proof
Let PRo and PRo ′ be the a posteriori probability of a right guess for P and P ′,
respectively. Analogously, let PRi and PRi ′ be the a priori probability of a right
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guess for P and P ′, respectively. Observe that PRi(π) = maxi πi = PRi ′(π). Hence
L+(π) ≤ L+′(π) ⇔ PRo(π)− PRi(π) ≤ PRo ′(π)− PRi ′(π)
⇔ PRo(π)− PRi(π)max
i
πi ≤
PRo ′(π)− PRi ′(π)
max
i
πi
⇔ PRo(π)− PRi(π)PRi(π) ≤
PRo ′(π)− PRi ′(π)
PRi ′(π)
⇔ PRo(π)PRi(π) − 1 ≤
PRo ′(π)
PRi ′(π)
− 1
⇔ L×(π) ≤ L×′(π)

Another criterion of comparison is the worst case. We consider the two notions
on some examples.
Example 7.2 Let us consider a 2k × 2k channel with the 2k ﬁrst natural numbers
as inputs and outputs, i.e. X = Y = {0, . . . , 2k − 1}. Consider a random input
variable X with values ranging in {0, 2k − 1}.
Consider the following program:
Program P(X)
1  Input X
2 if X = 0 or X = 1
3 then Output X
4 else Output one of the values {2, . . . , 2k − 1} chosen randomly
according to the uniform distribution
This program corresponds to a channel whose matrix is given in Figure 6.
0 1 2 . . . 2k − 1
0 1 0 0 . . . 0
1 0 1 0 . . . 0
2 0 0 p . . . p
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2k − 1 0 0 p . . . p
Fig. 6. Channel matrix (p = 1/(2k − 2) = 1/2k−1)
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Let us consider ﬁrst ML+. Because of Corollary 6.5, we know that ML+ is
reached on a corner point, i.e. a distribution of the form (q1, . . . , q2k) where each qi
is either 0 or 1/r, and there are r elements with value 1/r in the distribution.
For every corner point π we have PRi(π) = 1/r, thus maximizing L+ for a given
r is equivalent to maximizing PRo . From the channel matrix, one can see that
the maximum value of PRo is reached on an input distribution where the two ﬁrst
elements are as high as possible.
Therefore, we can restrict our study to distributions of the form
(1/r, . . . , 1/r, 0 . . . , 0), i.e. distributions where the elements with value 1/r are the
r ﬁrst elements.
For r = 1, we have:
PRi(1, 0, . . . , 0) = 1
PRo(1, 0, . . . , 0) = 1
Thus:
L+(1, 0 . . . , 0) = 0
L×(1, 0, . . . , 0) = 1
For r = 2, we have:
PRi(1/2, 1/2, 0 . . . , 0) = 1/2
PRo(1/2, 1/2, 0, . . . , 0) = 1
Thus:
L+(1/2, 1/2, 0 . . . , 0) = 1/2
L×(1/2, 1/2, 0, . . . , 0) = 2
For r ≥ 3, we have:
PRi(1/r, 1/r, 1/r, 0, . . . , 0) = 1/r
PRo(1/r, 1/r, 1/r, 0, . . . , 0) = 1/r + 1/r + (2k − 2) ∗ (1/r) ∗ p
= 3/r
Thus:
L×(1/r, 1/r, 1/r, 0, . . . , 0) = 3
L+(1/r, 1/r, 1/r, 0, . . . , 0) = 2/r
We observe that for r ≥ 3, the value of L+ decreases when r increases. Since
L+(1/3, 1/3, 1/3, 0, . . . , 0) = 2/3 > L+(1/2, 1/2, 0, . . . , 0) = 1/2 > L+(1, 0, . . . , 0) =
0, we have ML+ = 2/3 reached for r = 3.
In particular, ML+ > L+(1/2k, . . . , 1/2k) = 1/2k−1 for all k > 1.
Concerning L×, we have that, for r ≥ 3, L×(1/r, 1/r, 1/r, 0, . . . , 0) = 3 >
L×(1/2, 1/2, 0, . . . , 0) = 2 > L×(1, 0, . . . , 0) = 1, thus ML× = 3, reached on any
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distribution (1/r, 1/r, 1/r, 0, . . . , 0) with r ≥ 3, and in particular on the uniform
distribution, which conﬁrms Proposition 5.1.
Example 7.3 Let us consider the following program:
Program P′(X)
1  Input X
2 with probability 3/2k Output X
3 with probability 1− 3/2k Output a value in {0, 2k − 1}\{X} chosen randomly
according to the uniform distribution
This program corresponds to a channel whose matrix is given in Figure 7.
0 1 2 . . . 2k − 1
0 p1 p2 p2 . . . p2
1 p2 p1 p2 . . . p2
2 p2 p2 p1 . . . p2
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2k − 1 p2 p2 p2 . . . p1
Fig. 7. Channel matrix (p1 = 3/2k and p2 = (1− (3/2k))/(2k − 1))
The symmetry of the matrix implies that we can restrict the study to the a
priori distribution π = (1/r, 1/r, . . . , 1/r, 0, . . . , 0), where the r elements with value
1/r are the ﬁrst elements in the distribution.
In this case, for r ≥ 1:
PRi(π) = 1/r
PRo(π) = r(p1/r) + (2k − r)(p2/r)
= p1 + [(2k/r)− 1]p2
Finally:
L+(π) = p1 − p2 − 2r(2k−1)
Thus L+ increases when r increases, and ML+ = 1/2k−1 is reached for r = 2k (on
the uniform distribution).
L×(π) = rp1 + (2k − r)p2
= r(p1 − p2) + 2kp2
Since p1 > p2, L× increases when r increases, and thus ML× = 3 is obtained
for r = 2k (on the uniform distribution, which conﬁrms Proposition 5.1).
The programs P and P ′ have therefore the same worst-case multiplicative mea-
sures of leakage ML× = 3, but the worst case of the additive measure of leakage
ML+ is equal to 2/3 for P and equal to 1/2k−1 for P ′.
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8 Conclusion
We have considered two notions of leakage related to the Bayes risk. One of them,
which we call multiplicative, corresponds to the notion recently proposed by Smith
based on Renyi min-entropy. The other, which we call additive, is new. We have
shown that the two notions are equivalent in all distributions. If we consider the
distributions that give the worst case for the leakage, however, then the two notions
are diﬀerent. In particular, the multiplicative one has the worst case always in
correspondence of the uniform distribution, while this is not the case for the additive
one. So we can consider the new notion as a criterion, in addition to the one of
Smith, to help assessing the degree of protection oﬀered by a protocol or a program.
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